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Today, lawyer mobility is the norm rather than the excep-
tion.' No longer can a freshly minted lawyer expect to stay with
one law firm from law school graduation until election to part-
nership. This increased mobility is paralleled by a rapid rise in
the number of law firm breakups.2 While many attorneys who
practice together reach an amicable agreement to go their sepa-
rate ways, the acrimony involved in some breakups is legendary.
In one breakup, departing partners drove up in a van in the dead
of night and swiped away client files.3 In another, a lawyer
physically attacked his partner and threw him out of their office.4
In addition to engendering bitter feelings among the parties in-
volved, breakups frequently result in disputes that cost hundreds
of thousands of dollars in legal fees and drag on for decades.5
The most significant of these legal disputes involves the divi-
sion of fees and responsibilities from the firm's ongoing business
between the firm's continuing members and those who withdraw.
Out of either carelessness or a simple unwillingness to plan for
the worst, law firms often fail to adopt in advance a written
agreement spelling out the division of this "unfinished business,"
leaving courts to allocate the fees and responsibilities. Courts
t BA. 1995, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1998, The University of Chicago.
' See generally Robert W. Hillman, Hillman on Lawyer Mobility: The Law and Ethics
of Partner Withdrawals and Law Firm Breakups § 1.1 at 1:1-8 (Little, Brown 1994). Law
firms, understandably concerned about this trend, have attempted to respond. See, for
example, David Segal, Law Firms Court Own Attorneys; Treatment Improved in Bid to
Cut Defections, Wash Post Al, Al & A8 (Dec 30, 1996) (describing efforts by large Wash-
ington, D.C. law firms to prevent associate defections).
2 Breakups are not exclusively the domain of any particular type of firm. See, for ex-
ample, Amy Stevens and Edward Felsenthal, Mudge Rose to Close by End of the Year,
Wall St J B4 (Oct 3, 1995) (describing close of 126-year-old New York law firm Mudge
Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon); Edward Felsenthal, Hard to Do: The Messiest Divorce
That Jacoby & Meyers Ever Handled: Its Own, Wall St J Al (Jan 23, 1996) (describing
breakup of Jacoby & Meyers, the Los Angeles law firm that pioneered the controversial
use of TV advertising and fixed fees for law firms).
Laurel S. Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm Break-
ups, 61 Temple L Rev 1055, 1058 (1988).
4 Id.
Id at 1059.
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have increasingly relied on the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA7)6
to aid them in this task. The UPA provides that a partnership is
automatically dissolved when one partner leaves the firm.7 Fol-
lowing dissolution, all partners have a fiduciary duty8 to wind up
the unfinished business of the firm9 and to divide the resulting
fees with their former colleagues on a pro rata basis.' ° Through-
6 Uniform Partnership Act (1914), 6 ULA 125 (West 1995). By 1990, the UPA had
been adopted in forty-nine states, with few variations among the enacted statutes. Hill-
man, Lawyer Mobility § 4.1 at 4:2 (cited in note 1). Many of these jurisdictions have ap-
plied the UPA to law firm dissolutions. See, for example, Sehrempp and Salerno v Gross,
247 Neb 685, 529 NW2d 764, 770-72 (1995); Gull v Van Epps, 185 Wis 2d 609, 517 NW2d
531, 533 (Wis Ct App 1994); Kirsch v Leventhal, 181 AD2d 222, 586 NYS2d 330, 332-33
(NY App Div 1992); Ellerby v Spiezer, 138 IlM App 3d 77, 485 NE2d 413, 415-17 (1985);
Jewel v Boxer, 156 Cal App 3d 171, 203 Cal Rptr 13, 16-19 (1984); Resnick v Kaplan, 49
Md App 499, 434 A2d 582, 586-88 (Md Ct Spec App 1981). Several commentators, how-
ever, have argued that the UPA dissolution and windup provisions are inappropriate for a
law partnership. See, for example, Mark I. Weinstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership
Act: An Analysis of Its Impact on the Relationship of Law Firm Dissolution, Contingent
Fee Cases and the No Compensation Rule, 33 Duquesne L Rev 857, 872 (1995).
7 "The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from
the winding up of the business." UPA § 29, 6 ULA 752 (cited in note 6).
The Uniform Partnership Act (1994), 6 ULA 1 (West 1995), also known as the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), provides for an entity theory of partnership. The de-
parture of a partner ("dissociation") no longer automatically dissolves the partnership,
but can result in a winding up of the partnership business or a buyout of the departing
partner, depending on the circumstances. See Donald J. Weidner and John W. Larson,
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus Law 1, 6-13
(1993). The RUPA has been adopted in Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. RUPA, 6
ULA 1 (West Supp 1997). The RUPA provides that a partnership at will is still dissolved
when it is notified of a partner's express will to withdraw as a partner. RUPA § 801(1), 6
ULA 92. Almost all law partnerships are terminable at will. Robert W. Hillman, Hillman
on Lawyer Mobility: The Law and Ethics of Partner Withdrawals and Law Firm Breakups
§ 4.6.3 at 4:67 (Aspen Law & Bus 1997). Moreover, the process of winding up a partner-
ship under the RUPA resembles winding up a partnership under the UPA. Id § 4.7 at
4:80. Therefore, allocating fees from the unfinished business of a law partnership is likely
to change little under the RUPA.
UPA § 21 is titled "Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary." It provides, in relevant
part:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee
for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership
or from any use by him of its property.
UPA § 21(1), 6 ULA 608 (cited in note 6). The partners are fiduciaries among themselves
and owe each other fiduciary duties of utmost good faith, fairness, and loyalty. Alan R.
Bromberg and Larry E. Ribstein, 2 Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership § 6.07 at 6:67-
68 (Little, Brown 1996). For a good general discussion of partners' fiduciary duties, see id
§ 6.07 at 6:67-73.
' "On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding
up of partnership affairs is completed." UPA § 30, 6 ULA 756 (cited in note 6). See gener-
ally Bromberg and Ribstein, 2 Partnership § 7.08 at 7:73-88 (cited in note 8).
0 "No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business, ex-
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out the windup period, partners have a fiduciary duty to act in
good faith toward one another." Only upon completion of the un-
finished business is the partnership, and thus the fiduciary duty
between partners, terminated.'
Not all law firms, however, are organized as partnerships.
For a law firm organized as a professional corporation-an entity
that possesses qualities of both a partnership and a corpora-
tion-the problem of dividing "unfinished business" among the
attorney-shareholders is more complex. This complexity exists
because courts disagree on whether to apply the principles of
partnership law or corporate law to the problems that arise from
the withdrawal of lawyers from a professional corporation. In Fox
v Abrams," the Court of Appeal of California applied the unfin-
ished business rule of partnership law to a professional corpora-
tion. A majority of courts have followed the rule established in
Fox. Positive attributes of this approach include the consistent
treatment of lawyers across organizational forms and the ease of
judicial administration. Nevertheless, the Fox rule is inconsistent
with significant attributes of the professional corporation, most
notably its continued existence following a shareholder with-
drawal.
A minority of courts apply corporate law standards to the
withdrawal of an attorney-shareholder from a professional corpo-
ration.'4 While most state professional corporation statutes do
not specifically provide for the quick termination of a share-
holder's interest upon his withdrawal, 5 an analogy to general
cept that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in
winding up the partnership affairs." UPA § 18(f), 6 ULA 526 (cited in note 6). Post-
dissolution income is distributed to former partners of the old firm in accordance with
their percentage interests in the former partnership. The former partners are entitled to
"reasonable overhead expenses" attributable to the production of such income. Jewel, 203
Cal Rptr at 19. For a good explanation of the "unfinished business rule," see J. William
Callison, Partnership Law Issues in the Break-up and Dissolution of Law Firms, 21 Colo
Law 409,412-14 (1992).
" Bromberg and Ribstein, 2 Partnership § 6.07 at 6:72-73 (cited in note 8), citing UPA
§§ 21(1), 30. See also Jewel, 203 Cal Rptr at 19.
Bromberg and Ribstein, 2 Partnership § 7.01 at 7:6 (cited in note 8).
163 Cal App 3d 610, 210 Cal Rptr 260, 265-66 (1985). As of yet, there is no case law
on the application of RUPA to attorney-shareholder withdrawals from professional corpo-
rations. The application of the RUPA is likely to be similar to the application of the UPA._
See note 7.
"4 See, for example, Langhoff v Michael E. Marr, 81 Md App 438, 568 A2d 844, 855-56
(Md Ct Spec App 1990); Melby v O'Melia, 93 Wis 2d 51, 286 NW2d 373, 374 (Wis Ct App
1979).
SHillman, Lawyer Mobility § 6.5.1 at 6:22-23 (cited in note 1). Hillman infers this re-
quirement from various statutes common to many states, such as mandates for a prompt
transfer of shares to the corporation following a withdrawal, restrictions on ownership of
stock in more than one professional corporation, and denials of voting rights following in-
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corporate law is helpful. General corporate law provides for the
termination of a shareholder's interest in a corporation upon the
sale of his shares 6 and suggests that any fiduciary duty to wind
up unfinished business in a professional corporation would end
upon the sale of shares. 7
A case following the minority approach confirms this intui-
tion. According to Langhoff v Michael E. Marr ("Langhoff P'),"
under corporate law an employee of a professional corporation is
permitted to compete with the corporation following the termina-
tion of the employment relationship. This standard is clearly in-
consistent with the fiduciary duty of all attorney-shareholders in
a professional corporation to complete unfinished business upon
an attorney-shareholder withdrawal and to divide the resulting
fees pro rata. Instead, under corporate law, withdrawing attor-
ney-shareholders have no duty to complete the professional cor-
poration's business for the benefit of the continuing attorney-
shareholders, and vice versa. Given this termination of duty,
courts should allocate fees from unfinished business under the
corporate standard on a quantum meruit basis to reflect the rea-
sonable value of the work done by both sides before the with-
drawal. This corporate law standard should also apply where the
professional corporation has refused to purchase the shares of
the departing attorney and the court has denied the attorney's
request to force the professional corporation to do so. The profes-
sional corporation's refusal to repurchase is consistent with cor-
porate law approaches.' Thus, corporate law approaches should
also apply to the allocation of fees. And under Langhoff I, all that
voluntary resignation. Id § 6.5.1 at 6:21-22.
11 Id § 6.5.1 at 6:23.
1 Hillman declares that "[t]he concept of completing unfinished business during a
winding-up period is antithetical to the corporate model calling for a termination of
shareholder status upon the surrender of shares." Id § 6.5.1 at 6:23. He also claims, how-
ever, that simply applying corporate law cannot be the answer because "under those stat-
utes that provide for joint and several liability, the simple act of withdrawal may not in
and of itself eliminate the risk of liabilities later asserted." Id. Given the context of this
statement, Hilman may be rejecting the application of corporate law only insofar as it
concerns liability.
"81 Md App 438, 568 A2d 844, 853 (Md Ct Spec App 1990).
19 Courts will generally not force a close corporation to redeem a minority share-
holder's shares through involuntary dissolution absent a shareholder deadlock or illegal,
oppressive, or fraudulent conduct by the majority. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel
R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 239 (Harvard 1991). This rule may
not hold for professional corporations engaged in the practice of law. See Edward A. Ad-
ams, Judge Orders Dissolution of Law Firm: Standard is Lower Level of Conflict Than
Usual Under Business Corporation Law, NY L J 1, 1 (Feb 15, 1996) ("[A] lower level of
conflict can require dissolution of a law firm because courts must take into account 'the
consequences of that dissension upon the firm's clients and the public trust in the legal
system.).
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is required for corporate law to apply is that the employment re-
lationship be terminated.
Comparing the majority and minority approaches, a pattern
emerges in whether courts apply partnership or corporate law to
an attorney-shareholder withdrawal from a professional corpora-
tion. Courts, recognizing the professional corporation's continuity
of life, have implicitly distinguished attorney departures where
the professional corporation has dissolved from attorney depar-
tures where the professional corporation continues to exist. After
categorizing the withdrawal in this manner, courts have applied
partnership law to professional corporations that dissolve and
corporate law to those that survive. Courts have deviated from
this general rule, however, to account for extenuating circum-
stances pertaining to the withdrawal. Unfortunately, these de-
viations create an ad hoc "totality of the circumstances" test that
requires courts to engage in extensive factfinding and fails to
provide notice both to the parties involved and to future litigants.
This Comment argues that courts should explicitly acknowl-
edge the implicit and sensible categorization of attorney-
shareholder withdrawals based on whether the corporation dis-
solves (applying partnership law) or survives (applying corporate
law). They should also abandon attempts to account for extenu-
ating circumstances when deciding what law to apply to these
withdrawals. Instead, they should rely solely on this bright line
standard. Such a standard is more faithful than the "extenuating
circumstances" approach to both the structure of the professional
corporation and the applicable state corporate law statutes. It is
also easier for courts to administer. Furthermore, this bright line
standard will greatly benefit attorney-shareholders practicing in
professional corporations insofar as they will have fair notice of
the governing rule. They will be able to adjust their behavior ac-
cording to whether they desire partnership or corporate law
treatment. If they want partnership law treatment, they will dis-
solve the professional corporation; if they want corporate law
treatment, they will not.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the history of
law firm incorporation and the structure of the professional cor-
poration. Part II examines the existing case law on the with-
drawal of attorney-shareholders from a professional corporation.
Part III asserts that courts' treatment of attorney-shareholder
withdrawals is based upon their implicit categorization of the
withdrawal. It argues that all deviations from this rule are either
reconcilable with the rule or incorrect interpretations of the
partnership law principles from which the rule was derived. Part
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IV argues that courts should explicitly acknowledge their use of
the professional corporation's future in determining what law to
apply. It then proposes that courts rely solely on a default rule
under which partnership law applies to an attorney-shareholder
withdrawal only where the withdrawal is concurrent with the
dissolution of the professional corporation.
I. THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
A. History of the Professional Corporation
Prior to 1960, no state allowed professionals, including law-
yers, to incorporate. This denial of the incorporation option pre-
vented professionals from availing themselves of limited liability
and significant tax advantages, including the opportunity to es-
tablish pension plans offering greater benefits than those avail-
able to partnerships.21 Resistance to allowing law firm incorpora-
tion in particular rested upon two major concerns: first, the pos-
sibility that the corporation itself might interfere with the pro-
fessional relationship between each client and the attorney han-
dling his case; and second, the possibility that lawyers could
avoid malpractice liability.' By intense lobbying in the 1960s and
1970s, however, lawyers and other professionals succeeded in as-
suaging these concerns.23 Today, every jurisdiction allows law-
yers to incorporate and form "professional corporations" or "pro-
fessional associations." The tax benefits of incorporation de-
creased significantly with tax reform in the early 1980s,25 and to-
' Thomas A. Denker, Note, Lawyers and Limited Liability for Arizona's Profession-
als: Deliverance or Damnation?, 37 Ariz L Rev 355, 358 (1995); Steven E. Kalish, Lawyer
Liability and Incorporation of the Law Firm: A Compromise Model Providing Lawyer-
Owners with Limited Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious Liability on Some Lawyer-
Employees, 29 Ariz L Rev 563, 563 (1987).
21 Hillman, Lawyer Mobility § 6.1 at 6:2 (cited in note 1). See also William A. Gregory
and Thomas R. Hurst, Cases and Materials on Agency and Partnership 676 (West 1994).
Denker, Note, 37 Ariz L Rev at 358 (cited in note 20).
2 Id.
' The classification of a professional corporation or association for purposes of taxa-
tion is determined according to the standards of Internal Revenue Regulations. See Treas
Reg §§ 301.7701-2, 301.7701-3, 301.7701-4. The label applied to the entity under state law
is irrelevant. Harold G. Reuschlein and William A. Gregory, The Law of Agency and
Partnership § 301 at 504 (West 2d ed 1990).
2 The passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub L No 97-34, 95 Stat
172, and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-248, 96 Stat
324, "essentially equalized the tax treatment of corporations and non-corporate business
organizations." Denker, Note, 37 Ariz L Rev at 358-59 (cited in note 20). See also David
Pas, Professional Corporations and Attorney-Shareholders: The Decline of Limited Li-
ability, 11 J Corp L 371, 374 (1986) ("[R]ecent changes in the tax laws have removed
most, if not all, of the tax incentives for the creation of professional corporations. If there
is any reason left to incorporate a professional practice, it cannot be a tax reason.").
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day the primary advantage of the professional corporation is the
limited liability it affords to its members.26
B. Structure of the Professional Corporation
A professional corporation possesses qualities of both a part-
nership and a corporation. From a functional standpoint, a law
firm incorporated as a professional corporation is fundamentally
the same as a partnership. The shareholders of a professional
corporation own the business and are generally compensated like
partners in that they receive an annual salary and a share of
profits and losses.27 The shareholders also conduct themselves as
partners both in their relations with each other and in their rela-
tions with their clients.28 In other contexts, these similarities
have led courts to treat professional corporation shareholders
more like partners than like employees of the corporation.29
Many courts have also held that, from a purposive standpoint,
the professional corporation is more like a partnership than like
a corporation because a major motivating force behind lawyers'
use of the professional corporation was the tax benefits it pro-
Paas, 11 J Corp L at 374 (cited in note 25). The scope of limited liability for attor-
neys practicing in professional corporations varies considerably across states. Statutes
range from ones that hold lawyers responsible only for their own acts, errors, or omis-
sions, to statutes that hold all lawyers jointly and severally liable for claims arising from
the provision of legal services unless the firm maintains an adequate amount of liability
insurance. See HIllman, Lawyer Mobility § 6.3 at 6:8-11 (cited in note 1). Because courts
have traditionally exercised regulatory power over attorney conduct, id § 6.4 at 6:12,
there is a tension between judicial oversight and state statutes that limit attorney liabil-
ity. Courts have been both aggressive in expanding attorney liability beyond the state
statute, see id § 6.4.1 at 6:14-17, and deferential to the state statute, see id § 6.4.2 at 6:17-
18.
The limited liability protection afforded to attorneys by professional corporations may
soon be a moot point, however, with the advent in the past decade of limited liability
companies ('LLCs") and limited liability partnerships ("LLPs") as law firm structures.
For a discussion of the history of these two organizational forms and their attraction for
lawyers, see N. Scott Murphy, Note, It's Nothing Personal: The Public Costs of Limited
Liability Law Partnerships, 71 Ind L J 201, 206-14 (1995).
2 John Narducci, Note, The Application of Antidiscrimination Statutes to Sharehold-
ers of Professional Corporations: Forcing Fellow Shareholders Out of the Club, 55 Ford-
ham L Rev 839, 851-53 (1987).
Id at 853-54.
See, for example, Fountain v Metcalf, Zima & Company, PA, 925 F2d 1398, 1400
(11th Cir 1991) (reasoning that the shareholders of a professional corporation should be
treated like partners for purposes of Title VII actions); EEOC v Dowd & Dowd, Ltd, 736
F2d 1177, 1178-79 (7th Cir 1984) (same). See also Narducci, Note, 55 Fordham L Rev at
851-59 (cited in note 27) (arguing that under an economic realities test, shareholders of a
professional corporation are not employees for purposes of standing under the Age Dis-
crimination and Employment Act and Title VII). But see Jones v Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot
and Mannino, PC, 670 F Supp 597, 602 (W D Pa 1987) (holding that where an attorney-
shareholder of a professional corporation has little control over management of the corpo-
ration, he is an employee for ADEA purposes).
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vided. 30 Whether these holdings are correct today is open to dis-
pute, given that the disparity between the tax treatment of part-
nerships and professional corporations has disappeared. Addi-
tionally, while favorable tax treatment may have been the driv-
ing force behind choosing formation as a professional corporation
in the past, these holdings overlook the continuing importance of
a professional corporation's limited liability.
A professional corporation also possesses significant corpo-
rate attributes. The Treasury Regulations provide that the fol-
lowing six factors characterize a corporation: (1) associates; (2)
an objective to carry on business and divide the gains; (3) conti-
nuity of life; (4) centralization of management; (5) limited liabil-
ity; and (6) free transferability of interests.31 A professional cor-
poration possesses most or all of these attributes. The existence
of these common traits led one scholar to argue that "the notion
that shareholders of an incorporated law firm are 'partners' ex-
cept for tax purposes does not comport with the corporate charac-
teristics assigned their firms by state law."2 The most significant
of these corporate characteristics is continuity of life. A partner-
ship technically dissolves when one partner leaves. By contrast, a
professional corporation does not dissolve upon the departure of
a shareholder. The dissolution of a professional corporation is
subject to statutory provisions that are applicable to corporations
generally.33 These statutes suggest that in order for the profes-
"See Fox, 210 Cal Rptr at 265 ("It is well-known that the primary purpose of the law
permitting professionals to incorporate was to allow them to take advantage of various
tax benefits available to corporate employers and employees."); Vinall DDS, PC v
Hoffmnan, 133 Ariz 322, 651 P2d 850, 851-52 (Ariz 1982) ("[IThe primary reason for cre-
ating the professional corporation was to permit professionals to take advantage of vari-
ous federal tax provisions available to a corporation and its employees but not available
to self-employed persons or partnerships."). See also Petition of New Hampshire Bar As-
sociation, 110 NH 356, 266 A2d 853, 854 (1970) (explaining the tax benefits of incorpora-
tion); In the Matter of Rhode Island Bar Association, 106 RI 752, 263 A2d 692, 695 (1970)
(same); In the Matter of the Florida Bar, 133 S2d 554, 555 (Fla 1961) (same).
"Treas Reg § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (amended 1983).
Hillman, Lawyer Mobility § 6.2 at 6:6 (cited in note 1). See also Easterbrook and
Fischel, Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 248-49 (cited in note 19) (arguing that
corporate law should apply to participants in closely held corporations unless they explic-
itly contract for partnership-like rules because it is unrealistic to assume that they were
only motivated by the tax effects of incorporation).
"Richard S. Green, Firm Dissolutions: Causes and Effects, 475 PLIIComm 167, 173
(1988). See also Model Stat Close Corp Supp § 2(b) (1984) (amended 1994) ('This supple-
ment applies to a professional corporation organized under the [Model] Professional Cor-
poration Supplement."); Model Prof Corp Supp § 2 (1984) (amended 1994) ('The [Model]
Business Corporation Act applies to professional corporations... to the extent not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this Supplement.").
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sional corporation to dissolve, its shareholders must expressly in-
tend its dissolution. 4
II. SETTLING RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF ATTORNEYS IN A
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF AN
ATTORNEY-SHAREHOLDER
A. Majority View: Application of Partnership Law to Attorney-
Shareholder Withdrawals
Most courts apply partnership law in allocating the unfin-
ished business and resulting fees of a professional corporation
upon an attorney-shareholder withdrawal. This view relies on
the practical similarities between law corporations and law part-
nerships and on the problem of opportunistic behavior by attor-
neys leaving professional corporations.
1. Fox v Abrams.
The majority view was first articulated in Fox v Abrams." In
this case, four attorneys practiced together in a professional cor-
poration. Their relationship soured, and three of the attorneys
left to form a new corporation. The one remaining attorney then
changed the name of the original corporation to reflect these
changes." The parties had a "buy-sell agreement" providing for
the buyout of a withdrawing attorney-shareholder's interest in
the professional corporation. The lower court held that this buy-
sell agreement entitled the three withdrawing attorneys to a pro
rata share (reflective of former ownership interests) of the fees
received by the remaining attorney for work in progress as of
their resignation. The court, however, granted no similar right to
the remaining attorney for fees received by his departing col-
leagues upon their completion of cases pending at the time of
their withdrawal. Instead, Abrams, the sole remaining attorney,
was entitled only to quantum meruit for the reasonable value of
any services that he performed on those cases prior to the resig-
nations.37
"See Model Bus Corp Act §§ 14.03-14.07 (1984) (amended 1994) (explaining proce-
dures by which shareholders dissolve a corporation); Model Stat Close Corp Supp § 33(a)
(explaining shareholders' option to dissolve close corporation).
163 Cal App 3d 610, 210 Cal Rptr 260 (1985).
Although the court seems to take it as given that the original professional corpora-
tion broke up, see Fox, 210 Cal Rptr at 262, there is nothing in the decision stating that
the shareholders formally dissolved it.
7Id.
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The Court of Appeal of California reversed the lower court's
judgment and applied the "unfinished business" rule from part-
nership law. The court held that all work in progress on the date
of the resignations was unfinished business of the former firm.
Thus, all the attorneys were entitled to share in the fees from
this work in proportion to their ownership interests in the former
firm. 8 The court further held that all present and former share-
holders possessed a fiduciary duty to complete this unfinished
business for no extra compensation. 9 In reaching its decision, the
court declared:
The rule prevents partners from competing for the most re-
munerative cases during the life of the partnership in an-
ticipation that they might retain those cases should the
partnership dissolve. It also discourages former partners
from scrambling to take physical possession of files and
seeking personal gain by soliciting a firm's existing clients
upon dissolution."
The court further justified extending partnership law to a profes-
sional corporation by noting that the primary purpose of allowing
attorneys to incorporate was for tax purposes. The court held
that, as tax concerns were not at issue in the case at hand, attor-
neys practicing in a law corporation owed each other fiduciary
duties very similar to those law partners owe each other.4
2. The persuasive authority of Fox in allocating the
unfinished business of professional corporations.
Since Fox, several courts have applied partnership law to
allocate the professional corporation's unfinished business upon
dissolution." In Rothman v Dolin,' the two attorney-
shareholders of Dolin & Rothman, a professional corporation,
agreed to a dissolution. When a post-dissolution dispute arose
over the distribution of fees from work in progress at the time of
dissolution, the Court of Appeal of California affirmed the trial
court's application of partnership law to the unfinished busi-
ness." Similarly, in Sufrin v Hosier,' in which a professional
Id at 263.
Id at 265.
Id at 265, quoting Jewel, 203 Cal Rptr at 18.
41 Fox, 210 Cal Rptr at 265-66.
' These findings do not directly follow Fox. They appear to qualify the Fox holding by
applying it to withdrawal concurrent with the dissolution of a professional corporation.
See note 81.
20 Cal App 4th 755, 24 Cal Rptr 2d 571, 571 (1993).
Id at 573.
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corporation dissolved after one of its two attorney-shareholders
resigned, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois held that work in progress at the time of the dis-
solution was unfinished business and that the fees derived from
such work should be divided according to a UPA formula.46
In Sullivan, Bodney & Hammond v Bodney ("Sullivan 1")," a
Kansas court that followed Fox applied partnership law to allo-
cate the professional corporation's unfinished business when it
was clear that the attorney-shareholders intended to dissolve the
professional corporation but did not go through the formal dis-
solution process. An analogy to contract law provides support for
this conclusion; in contract law, it is generally accepted that the
parties' intentions to enter into an agreement are manifested by
their actions." Thus, when parties reach a preliminary agree-
ment with open terms but cannot agree on those terms, "the par-
ties are bound by their original agreement and the other matters
are governed by whatever terms a court will supply."49 In Sulli-
van I, the three attorney-shareholders fixed a date upon which
they would cease practicing law together as a professional corpo-
ration, but did not agree on the allocation of contingent fees. 0
The Court of Appeals of Kansas reversed the trial court's finding
that the attorney-shareholders were entitled to compensation in
quantum meruit for the fees resulting from cases commenced
prior to the dissolution date.51 Instead, the court applied partner-
ship law to allocate these fees even though the attorneys had not
complied with the formal requirements for dissolution of a pro-
fessional corporation.52 The appellate court found that because
the parties had clearly intended to dissolve, their actions consti-
tuted a de facto dissolution.53 The court in Sullivan I thus merely
filled in the gaps of the shareholders' preliminary agreement to
dissolve.
896 F Supp 766, 767 (N D IMl 1995).
Id at 768.
16 Kan App 2d 208,820 P2d 1248, 1249 (1991).
See E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Farnsworth on Contracts § 3.6 at 168-69 (Little, Brown
2d ed 1990).
Id § 3.8a at 187-88.
'o 820 P2d at 1249.
1 Id at 1250.
52 Id.
' Id at 1251. A subsequent case indicates that even though the parties practiced
separately, Sullivan, Bodney & Hammond continued to exist as a registered professional
corporation. Sullivan, Bodney & Hammond v Houston General Insurance Co, 2 F3d 824,
825 (8th Cir 1993) ("Sullivan 17"). This fact does not change the result in the first case,
which relied on a finding of"de facto dissolution."
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Fox's impact is not limited to cases in which the professional
corporation has officially dissolved, either expressly or construc-
tively. Following the holding in Fox, one court has applied part-
nership law to settle the unfinished business of a professional
corporation even when it continues to exist. In Vowell & Meel-
heim, PC v Beddow, Erben & Bowen, PA,M an attorney-
shareholder and two associates left a professional association to
form a new firm. Before leaving the old firm, the withdrawing at-
torney-shareholder contacted several of his clients without the
knowledge of the other attorney-shareholders. These clients
agreed to switch their representation from the old firm to the
new firm. The Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with the trial
court's finding that the withdrawing shareholder breached his fi-
duciary duty as an officer, director, and shareholder of the pro-
fessional association. The court also upheld the trial court's ap-
plication of partnership law to the professional association's un-
finished business, which included a requirement that the old firm
pay a reasonable hourly rate to the new firm for the time it spent
completing the cases that the withdrawing shareholder took with
him.5 5
3. Applying partnership law in other contexts to settle the
rights and responsibilities of attorney-shareholders in
professional corporations.
One court has also applied partnership law to settle the
rights and responsibilities of attorney-shareholders withdrawing
from a professional corporation. While this case is not directly on
point, it provides insight into the general mindset of courts
dealing with the problems of a professional corporation breakup.
In Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing, PC v Payne, Gates, Farthing
& Radd, PC,56 a Virginia case, four attorney-shareholders left a
professional corporation to form a separate professional corpora-
tion. The original professional corporation, then consisting of the
one remaining member, claimed that it was the owner of all cor-
porate assets, including accounts receivable, unearned profes-
sional liability insurance premiums, office furniture and equip-
ment, and fiduciary fees. The former members alleged in a cross-
bill and a counterclaim that the original professional corporation
had been formed only as a convenience to obtain certain tax and
other benefits, but that the law practice had been conducted as a
679 S2d 637, 639 (Ala 1996).
Id at 639-40.
244 Va 418, 422 SE2d 784, 785 (1992).
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partnership-both before and after the corporation's formation.
They asked that the court order an accounting of the original
firm in accordance with partnership law. In response, the origi-
nal firm argued that it was a "legal impossibility for a partner-
ship and a corporation to coexist under the circumstances."57 The
trial court concluded that, while the firm had been "a dejure pro-
fessional law corporation," it had been conducted as a partner-
ship and should be subject to partnership law.58
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court. It
held that the practices followed by the professional corporation
throughout its existence estopped its members from denying the
existence of the partnership.59 The professional corporation was a
close corporation in which the shareholders conducted the inter-
nal affairs of the law practice as a partnership. Thus, the trial
court properly settled their rights and liabilities according to
partnership law.0
B. Minority View: Application of Corporate Law to Attorney-
Shareholder Withdrawals
1. Applying corporate law in allocating the unfinished
business of a professional corporation.
One court has applied corporate law to allocate the unfin-
ished business of a professional corporation upon an attorney-
shareholder withdrawal. This holding was based on considera-
tions of statutory interpretation and corporate structure. In
Langhoff I,61 Langhoff left the professional association of Marr,
Langhoff, and Bennett, P.A. ("ML&B"), which was officially dis-
solved soon thereafter. The successor corporation, Marr P.C.,
filed suit to recover fees Langhoff earned subsequent to his de-
parture from a case that had been part of ML&B's business at
the time of his departure.62 The trial court applied partnership
law and found that Langhoff had breached his fiduciary duty to
ML&B. Because of this breach, he was required to give Marr the
fee he had received." This fee was deemed an asset of the profes-
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id at 788.
Id at 790.
"81 Md App 438, 568 A2d 844, 845 (Md Ct Spec App 1990). Langhoffs withdrawal
was therefore not concurrent with the dissolution of the professional corporation.
62 Id.
' Id at 848. The court considered Fox persuasive authority and offered the familiar
policy arguments: application of partnership law would reduce litigation, strengthen cli-
ent choice by reducing the profit motive, and maintain consistency in rules across organ-
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sional association, to be divided pro rata among the sharehold-
ers.6
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland vacated the lower
court's holding. The court held that a professional service corpo-
ration is a specific type of corporation, and where the state's Pro-
fessional Service Corporation Act is silent, general corporate law
should apply.65 The court also pointed to the fact that a profes-
sional corporation exists in perpetuity until dissolved in accor-
dance with corporate law.6' Finally, the court reasoned that the
application of partnership law to a professional service corpora-
tion would create an anomalous situation in which there are two
forms of legal partnerships-traditional partnerships and profes-
sional service corporations-but only one is able to take advan-
tage of corporate tax benefits.6 ' The application of partnership
law would also create inconsistencies because corporate princi-
ples would apply to resolve stock repurchases and continuity of
operations, but partnership law would control asset distribu-
tion.68 After deciding that corporate law should apply, the court
remanded the case to the lower court.69
2. Applying corporate law in other contexts to settle the
rights and responsibilities of attorney-shareholders in
professional corporations.
In other contexts, many courts apply corporate law to settle
the rights and responsibilities of a withdrawing attorney-
shareholder. These cases provide insight into courts' application
of corporate law to professional corporations.
In Melby v O'Melia, ° an attorney-shareholder withdrew from
a Wisconsin professional service corporation. The founders of the
izational forms. Id at 849-50.
Id at 850.
Id at 852.
Id at 852-53.
Id at 855. Applying partnership law in this context essentially makes the profes-
sional corporation a partnership except for tax purposes.
Id at 855.
In its discussion of previous cases involving similar issues, the court suggested
what corporate law entailed. Id at 853-54. On remand, however, the court of appeals
found that an oral agreement between the parties effected an immediate termination of
the firm and precluded the need to reach the issue of whether partnership or corporate
law applied. In lengthy dicta, however, the court suggested that partnership law applied.
Michael E. Marr, PC v Langhoff, 322 Md 657, 589 A2d 470, 475-78 (1991) ("Langhoffl").
In a later case, the Court of Special Appeals declared that its conclusion in Langhoff I
remains persuasive dicta. First American Bank of Maryland v Shivers, 97 Md App 405,
629 A2d 1334, 1341 n 5 (Md Ct Spec App 1993).
70 93 Wis 2d 51, 286 NW2d 373, 373 (Wis Ct App 1979).
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corporation had made no provisions in their bylaws or articles of
incorporation for acquiring the shares of a withdrawing share-
holder. The departing attorney sought an accounting and dissolu-
tion of the service corporation according to partnership stan-
dards. The trial court denied his request, holding that the case
should be decided under corporate standards.7'
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin upheld the trial court.
The appellate court gave three reasons for its holding. First, limi-
tations on service corporations are not designed to protect the
shareholders in their relationships with one another, but to pro-
tect individual clients or the general public.72 Second, in the ab-
sence of specific authority to the contrary, corporate standards
should apply as a default rule when a shareholder withdraws
from a service corporation.73 Finally, a service corporation exists
in perpetuity until dissolved in accordance with state corporation
law.74 The court, however, did not decide what remedy corporate
standards provided to the withdrawing attorney-shareholder.75
A subsequent case elaborated on the Melby court's reasoning.
In Corlett, Killian, Hardeman, McIntosh and Levi, PA v Merritt,76
three minority attorney-shareholders left a professional service
corporation. These attorneys were unable to resolve amicably
their claim that the successor corporation ought to redeem their
shares. Thus, they sued for compelled redemption of their
shares.7 The trial court found in favor of the departing attorneys.
71 Id.
'2 Id at 374.
7Id.
71 Id.
' The withdrawing attorney-shareholder is probably out of luck. See note 19; Corlett,
Killian, Hardeman, McIntosh and Levi, PA v Merritt, 478 S2d 828, 831 (Fla Dist Ct App
1985) ("Absent such a provision for redemption, courts will not write such an agreement
for the parties."). However, the Court stated in dictum that:
Attorneys are in a unique situation because their profession is governed by specific
ethical standards, and we cannot say that in all situations a service corporation
composed of lawyers will be treated like a regular business corporation. The legisla-
ture ... provided a manner of sale and purchase of shares of a service corporation
when the owner of those shares became disqualified to practice .... Ethical consid-
erations may require, when one member of [a] service corporation voluntarily leaves
that service corporation, that he be compensated for his shares in the service corpo-
ration at a fair value.
Melby, 286 NW2d at 375.
478 S2d 828, 829 (Fla Dist Ct App 1985).
Id. The court also noted that the departing shareholders claimed an interest in cer-
tain contingent fee cases for work performed before their departure. The corporation
counterclaimed for moneys collected, after departure, by the shareholders for fees earned
by the corporation before their departure. Id at 829 n 2. These claims were for quantum
meruit-an implicit acknowledgment by the parties that there was no winding up and di-
vision of fees pro rata as partnership law would require.
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It ruled that the professional corporation was required to redeem
their shares at fair or book value as of the date of departure.78
The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed, holding that a
court could not compel a professional service corporation engaged
in the practice of law to redeem the shares held by minority
shareholders who voluntarily resigned. The court would not or-
der a redemption unless a statute, the articles of incorporation,
or an agreement between the parties provided for such a redemp-
tion.79 The court declared that although this result might be in-
equitable, it provided an incentive for future parties to contract
in advance for the redemption of shares upon withdrawal. When
confronted with this same issue, other courts have reached simi-
lar results.0
III. THE COURTS' IMPLICIT CATEGORIZATION OF WITHDRAWALS
Decisions about whether to apply partnership or corporate
law to an attorney-shareholder withdrawal from a professional
corporation appear arbitrary at first glance. Upon closer inspec-
tion, however, the cases demonstrate a clear pattern. Courts im-
plicitly conduct a two-tiered analysis. First, they apply a "con-
tinuation of existence" test to determine whether the attorney
withdrawal is simultaneous with the dissolution of the profes-
sional corporation or whether the professional corporation con-
tinues to exist following the withdrawal.8 ' If the withdrawal is in
Id at 829.
Id at 831-34. The court based its decision on the principle that courts should not
write an agreement for the parties. Id at 831. Nevertheless, the court left open the possi-
bility of court-ordered dissolution where there is a deadlock or threat of discontinued cor-
porate business due to evenly divided ownership interests. Id at 832. This holding is
clearly a corporate law solution. See note 19.
"See Trittipo v O'Brien, 204 111 App 3d 662, 561 NE2d 1201, 1208 (1990) (holding
that departing attorney-shareholder was not entitled to compelled redemption of shares);
Berrett v Purser & Edwards, 876 P2d 367, 371 (Utah 1994) (same). But see Vinall, 651
P2d at 852 (arguing that equitable and ethical reasons mandate redemption of a depart-
ing shareholder's shares).
"1 Fox did not limit its holding to professional corporations that dissolve. However, the
majority of courts that consider that case persuasive authority seem to impose this limi-
tation implicitly. See Rothman, 24 Cal Rptr 2d at 571-72; Sufrin, 896 F Supp at 769. In
doing so, these courts are actually more faithful to the holding in Jewel than that in Fox.
The Fox court overlooked the fact that the law partnership in Jewel was dissolved by mu-
tual agreement of its partners before any disputes arose while the law corporation in Fox
was never officially dissolved. In Fox, the law corporation continued to exist under a dif-
ferent name following the withdrawals. 210 Cal Rptr at 262.
The Fox court defended its decision by declaring that "It]he law should simply recog-
nize that the lawyers once practiced together and are now practicing separately on the
same cases as before, and no good purpose is served by characterizing one entity as the
members who left and the other entity as the members who remained." 210 Cal Rptr at
265. One commentator has read this sentence to imply that it is irrelevant whether the
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the former category, courts apply partnership law. If it is in the
latter category, courts apply corporate law. If courts find that
this first tier inquiry is not dispositive, they will sometimes use a
second test in which they analyze the extenuating circumstances
of the withdrawal in order to determine whether partnership or
corporate law should apply. This is a "totality of the circum-
stances" test.
A. The Continuation of Existence Test
Courts have applied partnership law in two situations: first,
when it is clear that the attorney-shareholders have dissolved
the professional corporation, as in Rothman82 and Sufrin;83 sec-
ond, when the shareholders have manifested an intention to dis-
solve the professional corporation but have failed, as in Sullivan
I," to comply with the formal requirements of dissolution. Appli-
cation of partnership law, insofar as it requires the shareholders
of a defunct professional corporation to wind up its unfinished
business, makes good legal sense for two reasons. First, when the
professional corporation is dissolved, there is no longer any in-
consistency between the partnership solution and the profes-
sional corporation's continued existence. In fact, the dissolution
and windup provisions of partnership law are particularly ap-
propriate when the equivalent of an attorney withdrawal from a
law partnership has occurred.85 Second, when a corporation is
dissolved, its assets must be distributed to its shareholders. On-
going cases are considered part of a professional corporation's as-
sets.86 Therefore, in the absence of a previous agreement between
the shareholders, dividing the fees from ongoing business on a
pro rata basis is the most straightforward and most equitable
solution.
fm dissolves completely and that the Jewel rule applies to a "partial dissolution." An-
thony L. Marks, Comment, Barefoot Shoemakers: An Uncompromising Approach to Polic-
ing the Morals of the Marketplace When Law Firms Split Up, 19 Ariz St L J 509, 527 n
134 (1987). This application of Jewel, however, makes little sense. See Part IIIA.
24 Cal Rptr 2d at 573.
896 F Supp at 767.
820 P2d at 1251.
The Model Business Corporation Act provides for a windup period of unfinished
business following dissolution of a corporation. See Model Bus Corp Act § 14.05(a) (cited
in note 34).
"See DelCasino v Koeppel, 207 AD2d 374, 615 NYS2d 454, 455 (NY App Div 1994)
(holding that pending contingency fee cases are corporate assets subject to distribution
upon dissolution); Rothman, 24 Cal Rptr 2d at 573 (holding that unfinished business con-
sists of all matters in progress that have not been completed at the time the professional
corporation is dissolved).
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Conversely, courts apply corporate law when the profes-
sional corporation has continued to exist after the withdrawal of
the attorney-shareholders, as in Langhoff I, Melby,88 Corlett,89
Trittipo,9' and Berrett.9 This rule makes good legal sense. Where
a professional corporation has retained its corporate form, a
court-ordered dissolution and accounting is reserved for the ex-
treme cases such as a shareholder deadlock or the commission of
oppressive acts by majority shareholders.2 Application of corpo-
rate law is also the more efficient solution.93 Forcing professional
corporations to undergo a dissolution and winding-up period
every time an attorney leaves would be extremely burdensome
given the frequency with which attorneys move from firm to firm.
It would also be inconsistent with the professional corporation's
continuity of life.
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
If courts did not progress beyond the first tier of analysis,
they would reflexively apply corporate law to all cases in which a
professional corporation continues to exist after an attorney-
shareholder withdraws. The decision by the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland in Langhoff I, however, does not always apply
in these cases. In Langhoff I, the court relied on statutory lan-
guage and corporate structure in finding that corporate law
should apply to allocate fees from unfinished business upon an
attorney-shareholder withdrawal. Some courts instead apply
partnership law to these cases. This suggests that they are ex-
amining the totality of the circumstances in deciding what law to
apply following the initial categorization of the withdrawal as not
concurrent with the dissolution of the professional corporation.94
Of these extenuating circumstances, two worth noting are the
breach of fiduciary duty and the "partial dissolution."
At least one court has applied partnership law to the with-
drawal of an attorney-shareholder who breached his fiduciary
" 568 A2d at 855.
286 NW2d at 374.
478 S2d at 829.
" 561 NE2d at 1204-05.
"876 P2d at 370.
See note 19.
This Comment assumes that corporate law in these situations extinguishes any fi-
duciary duties of the withdrawing attorney-shareholder upon termination of his employ-
ment. See text accompanying note 18.
' No court has examined the totality of the circumstances after finding that the pro-
fessional corporation has dissolved and that partnership law is appropriate.
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duty to a non-dissolving professional corporation. In Vowell,95 one
attorney-shareholder and two associates left the professional as-
sociation in which they practiced law. The court found that the
withdrawing shareholder had breached his fiduciary duty to the
professional corporation by contacting firm clients to discuss
their future representation.96 The court, applying partnership
law, held that the withdrawing shareholder must account for the
fees from cases he took from the firm.17 Although the court used a
partnership law rationale for its decision, it was not applying the
unfinished business rule. Instead, it was punishing the with-
drawing attorney for his breach of fiduciary duty to the profes-
sional corporation that had occurred before, rather than after, his
withdrawal. Pictured in this light, this case is reconcilable with
the general rule that corporate law should apply to attorney
withdrawals from non-dissolving professional corporations.
Some courts apply partnership law to withdrawals from a
professional corporation where the professional corporation has
not officially dissolved, but where the withdrawals have signifi-
cantly changed the firm's composition from its pre-withdrawal
state.99 These withdrawals occupy a middle ground between the
complete dissolution of the professional corporation and the de
rninimis withdrawal. Accordingly, they may be thought of as par-
tial dissolutions.' 0  In Fox, for example, three attorney-
shareholders and an associate left the professional corporation in
which they practiced law.' ' The shareholders did not dissolve the
'5 679 S2d at 639.
Id.
7Id at 640.
" This argument is consistent with the Langhoff I courts suggestion in dicta that,
under corporate law, a withdrawing shareholder might have to account for the fees from
cases he took from the professional corporation if he owed a fiduciary duty to it through
his status as an officer, director, or stockholder. See LanghoffI, 568 A2d at 856.
Courts may be applying partnership law in this situation because they believe that
the change is significant enough that the successor corporation is totally different from
the original corporation. Alternatively, they may be applying partnership law because
they believe that equity requires it.
"The case law demonstrates that courts have not quantified the change in composi-
tion necessary for a finding of what this Comment terms "partial dissolution." In Corlett,
where the court applied corporate law, the three withdrawing shareholders owned a com-
bined 29.5 percent interest in the corporation. 478 S2d at 832. In Langhoff I, where the
court also applied corporate law, the withdrawing shareholder owned a 37.5 percent in-
terest in the corporation. 568 A2d at 845. In Fox, where the court applied partnership
law, the three withdrawing shareholders together owned a 56.25 percent interest in the
corporation. 210 Cal Rptr at 262 n 1. In Boyd, where the court applied partnership law,
the four withdrawing shareholders together owned a 40 percent interest in the corpora-
tion. 422 SE2d at 786. Absent clear standards in this area, courts have relative freedom
to find a justification for the application of partnership law.
1 210 Cal Rptr at 262.
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professional corporation, and it continued to exist under a differ-
ent name. °2 The court nonetheless applied partnership law to
settle the unfinished business of the professional corporation. 1°3
To support their finding of "partial dissolution," courts often
appeal to partnership aspects of the professional corporation. The
fact pattern in Boyd was similar to that in Fox: four attorney-
shareholders left the professional corporation in which they prac-
ticed law, leaving one attorney-shareholder behind; the attorney-
shareholders did not dissolve the original professional corpora-
tion."' After finding that these attorneys had acted like partners
in many respects, the court in Boyd applied partnership law to
settle the rights and responsibilities of the attorneys.0 5 However,
many professional corporations experience significant turnover
and many attorneys practicing in these corporations act like
partners. Taken together, the approaches in Fox and Boyd sug-
gest that courts have significant freedom to apply partnership
law to attorney-shareholder withdrawals.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A BRIGHT LINE STANDARD OF
CATEGORIZATION
A. Problems with the Current Approaches
1. Failure to give notice to the parties involved.
This Comment has argued that courts' categorization of at-
torney-shareholder withdrawal cases under the "continuation of
existence test" makes sense. One problem with the categorization
process, however, is that courts have been making the categori-
zation determination implicitly, not explicitly. This contradicts
the fundamental concept of notice in the law, which requires that
individuals know the law in advance in order to foresee its im-
pact on their rights and responsibilities." 6 Courts should there-
fore explicitly acknowledge the continuation of existence test and
explicitly explain how they are categorizing the withdrawal in
the case before them. This will provide attorneys in a profes-
sional corporation with a rough idea of whether partnership law
'"Id.
'Fox, 210 Cal Rptr at 265.
'"Boyd, 422 SE2d at 785.
..Id at 790.
'"See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 8.4 at 265 (Little,
Brown 4th ed 1992) (arguing that law must be public if it is to serve its deterrence func-
tion).
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or corporate law will apply when an attorney withdraws from the
corporation.
Explicitly recognizing the categorization will have a pro-
found effect on the behavior of the parties involved. Not only will
the attorney-shareholders know what law they are subject to,
they will also be able to affect what law the courts apply. If at-
torney-shareholders desire to be treated under partnership law,
they will make an agreement to dissolve the professional corpo-
ration in conjunction with an attorney withdrawal. On the other
hand, if they desire corporate law treatment, they will not make
such an agreement.
2. The problem with the ad hoc "totality of the
circumstances" test.
The second tier of the categorization process creates havoc
within the law of shareholder withdrawal. This Comment has as-
serted that courts sometimes resort to an ad hoc factfinding ap-
proach. Under this approach, they examine the extenuating cir-
cumstances to determine whether to apply partnership law or
corporate law. This method does not lead to optimal results.
Cases like Fox and Boyd are particularly troubling. In these
cases, the courts applied partnership law after determining that
the professional corporation had undergone a "partial dissolu-
tion." First, these holdings are most likely a misapplication of
partnership case law.0 7 Second, this analysis requires an impre-
cise measurement of a number of factors, including whether the
change in the professional corporation's composition is significant
and whether the professional corporation has acted more like a
partnership than a corporation. This uncertainty presents a sec-
ond serious problem of notice to the parties. There is no clear line
between a withdrawal and a "partial dissolution,"' nor is there
one clarifying when a professional corporation looks more like a
partnership than a corporation."0 9 Different courts will weigh
"'See note 81.
.. See note 100.
"The courts occasionally find that a "de facto" or "implied" partnership exists where
lawyers take the corporate form but act as partners. See, for example, Boyd, 422 SE2d at
790. Although case law is unsettled on what factors create an apparent partnership,
"[m]ost court decisions have focused on whether the attorneys have given the client rea-
son to believe that representation was being provided by a partnership." Ronald E. Mal-
len and Sheila M. Lamb, The Liability of Partnerships and Professional Corporations, 2
Legal Malpractice Rep 9, 10 (1990). It is not clear why the client's perspective should af-
fect the type of law that governs relations between the attorneys. See also Kelvin H.
Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and Legitimacy of the Incorpo-
rated Partnership, 33 Am U L Rev 559, 579-82 (1984) (listing factors courts will consider
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these circumstances differently, precluding a uniform application
of the law and preventing the parties from being able to antici-
pate a court's actions.
This approach also places courts in a difficult position. First,
courts must expend valuable judicial resources in factfinding.
Second, judges are not business experts." ° It may be difficult,
when given poorly defined standards and no definitive policy ra-
tionale, for these judges to determine what constitutes "signifi-
cant change" for a professional corporation or whether a profes-
sional corporation has functioned more like a partnership or a
corporation."' Even if courts do possess the requisite technical
expertise, case law suggests that a governmental body cannot ar-
bitrarily label a professional corporation a partnership." This
logic would seem to apply to courts deciding attorney withdrawal
cases.
B. Proposed Application of Partnership Law Only to Dissolution
of Professional Corporations
Given the notice, judicial economy, and expertise problems
associated with the totality of circumstances test, courts should
abandon it entirely. In its place, courts should rely solely on the
continuation of existence test. This test is a bright line rule that
applies partnership law to attorney-shareholder withdrawals
where there is clear evidence of an agreement or an intention to
dissolve the corporation. Corporate law should apply in all other
circumstances. This new standard will benefit both the parties
when determining whether a business venture is a partnership).
Conversely, individuals who take advantage of practicing in a corporate form will be
estopped from denying the existence of the corporation. See Early Detection Center, Inc v
Wilson, 248 Kan 869, 811 P2d 860, 866 (1991) (describing doctrine of corporation by es-
toppel); Shapoff v Scull, 222 Cal App 3d 1457, 272 Cal Rptr 480, 486-87 (1990) (same);
Jones v Teilborg, 151 Ariz 240, 727 P2d 18, 25 (Ariz Ct App 1986) (applying doctrine of
corporation by estoppel). In many cases, the factual circumstances simultaneously sup-
port a finding that the professional corporation was treated as a partnership and a find-
ing that it was treated like a corporation.
' See Dodge v Ford Motor Co, 204 VIich 459, 170 NW 668, 684 (1919).
.. This inquiry might be incorrect altogether. Maybe courts should ask what the par-
ties would have contracted for had transaction costs been zero, not whether the profes-
sional corporation is more like a partnership than a publicly held corporation. See
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 250 (cited in note
19). Assuming that the parties were not ignorant of the structure of the professional cor-
poration, it is reasonable to conclude that where the corporation has not been dissolved,
they would have wanted corporate law treatment.
"See Kurzner v United States, 413 F2d 97, 111 (5th Cir 1969) (finding arbitrary and
discriminatory the IRS Commissioner's decision to treat validly incorporated professional
service organizations as partnerships for federal income tax purposes if they more closely
resemble partnerships than corporations).
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involved and the courts. The parties will know when partnership
law applies and when corporate law applies. With this knowl-
edge, they will be able to adjust their behavior accordingly. 1 3
Furthermore, courts will have clear guidance in determining
whether to apply partnership or corporate law."4
In applying corporate law to attorney-shareholder with-
drawals that are not concurrent with the dissolution of the pro-
fessional corporation, courts should apply the principles that
govern closely held corporations. A closely held corporation is a
special corporate form that includes some or all of the following
factors: a limited number of shareholders; limited or nonexistent
trading of the corporation's shares; and a significant level of
shareholder involvement in the management of the corporation.
The attorneys in a professional corporation resemble sharehold-
ers in a closely held corporation much more than they resemble
shareholders in a publicly held corporation." 5 Like the owners of
a closely held corporation, the attorney-shareholders in a profes-
sional corporation are of a limited number and are heavily in-
volved in managing the corporation. Furthermore, public trading
is nonexistent. This similarity between closely held and profes-
sional corporations has two ramifications for the proposed rule.
First, because the rule does not require that a professional corpo-
ration repurchase a withdrawing attorney's shares,"6 attorneys
should contract for such a provision in advance. Second, share-
holders in a close corporation owe each other fiduciary duties of
loyalty and good faith. The level of these fiduciary duties may
approach that of the fiduciary duties of partners."7 By applying
"Because the rule does not eliminate court factfinding entirely, see note 114, it is
vulnerable to the objection that it does not provide sufficient notice to the parties. There
are at least two responses to this objection. First, this rule greatly improves the totality of
the circumstances test, which requires parties to guess whether they would receive part-
nership or corporate law treatment depending on the share ownership percentage of
withdrawing attorney-shareholders. Second, it should be fairly clear to both the parties
and the courts when the parties have agreed to dissolve the professional corporation-
this inquiry into objective intent is omnipresent in contract law.
.. Clear guidance does not mean the absence of any factfinding responsibilities. A
court might have to determine whether the parties really intended to dissolve the profes-
sional corporation. See text accompanying notes 48-49. In addition, once a court deter-
mines which law to apply, it may have to determine whether the departing attorney-
shareholder violated his fiduciary duties. See LanghoffI, 568 A2d at 855-56. See also Part
IV.D.1.
"See Marks, Comment, 19 Ariz St L J at 537 n 206 (cited in note 81). See also Model
Stat Close Corp Supp § 2(b) (cited in note 33) ('This Supplement applies to a professional
corporation organized under the [Model] Professional Corporation Supplement...
.. See text accompanying note 19.
" See Donahue v Rodd Electrotype Co, 367 Mass 578, 328 NE2d 505, 515 (1975) ("Be-
cause of the fundamental resemblance ... we hold that stockholders in the close corpora-
tion owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enter-
1997] 1L389
The University of Chicago Law Review
the duties of close corporations to attorney-shareholders, courts
can impose a powerful limitation on the freedom of attorneys to
withdraw indiscriminately from a professional corporation and to
take its business with them."8
C. Justifications for the Bright Line Standard
1. Legal justifications: considerations of statutory language
and the structure of the professional corporation.
The proposed bright line rule is much more faithful to state
corporation statutes and to the structure of professional corpora-
tions than the two tier process. Most state professional corpora-
tion statutes provide that where the professional corporation act
is silent, the state's business corporation law applies unless in-
consistent with the provisions of the professional corporation
law."' Under the corporate model, a shareholder's interest in the
corporation is terminated upon the sale of his shares.'2 The ap-
plication of partnership law principles of dissolution and windup
upon a withdrawal from a non-dissolving professional corpora-
tion requires the withdrawing attorney-shareholder to maintain
an interest in the corporation. It therefore directly contradicts
the state statutes that contain this provision.
Even if the statute establishing the professional corporation
does not explicitly mandate corporate law as a default rule, when
the corporation continues to exist after the withdrawal, the ap-
plication of corporate law is more faithful to the structure of the
professional corporation. The principles of partnership law are
inconsistent with the professional corporation's continuity of life.
In order to apply these principles faithfully, a court would be re-
quired to dissolve the corporation, a task it is generally unwilling
to do." However, neither this structural problem nor the afore-
mentioned state statutory language is relevant once the profes-
sional corporation has officially dissolved. In that situation,
prise that partners owe to one another."); Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Law of
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises §§ 235, 268 (West 3d ed 1983) (discussing
similarities between partnerships and close corporations).
"Once again, the factfinding inherent in this inquiry conflicts with the need for no-
tice. However, courts are very experienced in determining breaches of fiduciary duty in
corporate law cases. See Part IV.D.1.
" Hillman, Lawyer Mobility § 6.7.2 at 6:30 (cited in note 1). See also Model Stat Close
Corp Supp § 2(a) (cited in note 33) ('The [Model] Business Corporation Act applies to
statutory close corporations to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Supplement.").
See text accompanying note 16.
"See note 19.
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partnership law serves as a convenient way for the court to dis-
tribute the assets of a professional corporation.
2. Policy justifications: avoiding the inequities of
partnership law and inconsistent treatment of the
professional corporation.
The proposed bright line rule makes better sense from a
policy standpoint as well. First, the bright line rule reduces the
inequities that occur when partnership law is applied to a corpo-
ration that continues to exist. In some of these situations, appli-
cation of the no-compensation rule may deny an attorney the
benefits of his or her labor while allowing a windfall to fellow
shareholders who had a relatively light burden during the wind-
up phase. 2 Seen in this light, the no-compensation rule may
promote dissolution by encouraging shareholders to "grab and
leave" when their wind-up duties would be light relative to those
of their fellow shareholders. 2 3
The no-compensation rule also creates the problems of "lock
out" and "lock in."' By forcing the partners to reallocate cases in
an equitable manner and by not allowing compensation for work
performed, the no-compensation rule may "lock out" the client
from retaining his chosen attorney, who has little incentive to
continue working on the case. 5 Conversely, the no-compensation
rule may "lock in" dissatisfied shareholders into the professional
corporation by forcing them to remain together because the wind-
up burdens would be sufficiently large to render dissolution in-
feasible."
Under the bright line rule this Comment has proposed, part-
nership law would apply only after the shareholders decided to
dissolve the professional corporation. Given that this decision
must be made through formal procedures rather than unilater-
ally by one shareholder, the proposed rule will minimize the con-
cern of the impact of partnership law principles on the decision to
dissolve.
The bright line rule also avoids the problem identified in
Langhoff I: that "consistency" in treatment across organizational
forms might lead to absurd results. The application of partner-
'WWeinstein, 33 Duquesne L Rev at 873 (cited in note 6).
Mid.
'For hypothetical examples of lock out and lock in, see Mark H. Epstein and Bran-
don Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation
Rule and Client Choice, 73 Cal L Rev 1597, 1615-19 (1985).
'Weinstein, 33 Duquesne L Rev at 874-75 (cited in note 6).
6Id at 875.
19971 1391
The University of Chicago Law Review
ship law to professional corporations would effectively create two
tiers of partnerships, with only one receiving favorable tax
treatment. Given that the tax benefits of incorporation are al-
most nonexistent today, applying partnership law would render
professional corporation statutes partially superfluous. 7 In addi-
tion, applying partnership law would also divide professional
corporation functions into two tiers: stock repurchases and conti-
nuity of operations would receive corporate treatment, but asset
distribution would receive partnership treatment. 8 Once the
professional corporation is dissolved, however, there is no lack of
uniformity. At that time, the professional corporation has ceased
to exist and the only concern is how its assets are to be distrib-
uted.
D. Potential Problems with the Bright Line Standard
1. The problem of an attorney-shareholder "grabbing and
leaving."
One problem that courts frequently cite in defending the
partnership law model is that of "grabbing and leaving."' 9 If at-
torney-shareholders are not obliged to share fees on a pro rata
basis from cases they remove from the professional corporation,
they will have every incentive to grab lucrative clients and leave
the firm. The possibility of grabbing and leaving is particularly
acute under the proposed bright line rule, because withdrawing
attorney-shareholders would be free to compete with their former
firm if it continues to exist. However, courts can mitigate this po-
tential problem by aggressively enforcing the two loyalties owed
by withdrawing attorney-shareholders: their fiduciary duty to
the professional corporation, and their fiduciary duty to their cli-
ents.
First, courts can police withdrawals to ensure that the with-
drawing attorney-shareholder did not breach his fiduciary duty
as an officer, director, or shareholder of the firm."0 In this con-
text, the contours of fiduciary duty are derived from the princi-
ples of agency. 1' An attorney-shareholder is an agent of the pro-
'See note 25.
See text accompanying notes 61-68.
See, for example, Fox, 210 Cal Rptr at 265.
'See text accompanying notes 95-98. Another cause of action a law firm might bring
against departing attorney-shareholders who take firm clients with them is the common
law tort of intentional interference with contract. See Mark D. Flanagan, Comment, Lat-
eral Moves and the Quest for Clients: Tort Liability of Departing Attorneys for Taking
Firm Clients, 75 Cal L Rev 1809, 1810-11 (1987).
"'See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 387-96 (1958).
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fessional corporation by virtue of being a shareholder,"2 and is an
agent of the law firm generally, regardless of its form.'33 In mat-
ters concerning the firm's business, an attorney must act solely
for the benefit of the firm." An attorney must also make full dis-
closures to other members of the firm about matters affecting the
firm's business. Most significantly, an attorney is forbidden
from competing with the firm while he remains in its employ-
ment,'36 although he may compete with it after termination of the
employment relationship.' In determining whether an attorney
has breached a fiduciary duty to his law firm, courts have fol-
lowed this before-after distinction and have construed "compete"
to mean the solicitation of firm clients or employees without the
firm's knowledge while still in the employment of the firm. 3 Ab-
sent such activity, courts have found that the departing attorney-
shareholder has not breached his fiduciary duty. 9
'See text accompanying notes 117-18.
'Peter R. Jarvis and Tracy J. White, Civil Liability Aspects of Lawyers Leaving Law
Firms, 1993 Prof Law 54, 54 (1993 Symposium); Marks, Comment, 19 Ariz St L J at 537-
38 (cited in note 81).
'See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (cited in note 131).
'See Dowd and Dowd, Ltd v Gleason, 284 Ill App 3d 915, 672 NE2d 854, 862 (1996);
Meehan v Shaughnessy, 404 Mass 419, 535 NE2d 1255, 1264 (1989); Bray v Squires, 702
SW2d 266, 270 (Tex Ct App 1985).
'"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to compete with the
principal concerning the subject matter of his agency." Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 393 (cited in note 131).
'""After the termination of his agency, in the absence of a restrictive agreement, the
agent can properly compete with his principal as to matters for which he has been em-
ployed... Even before the termination of the agency, he is entitled to make arrange-
ments to compete, except that he cannot properly use confidential information peculiar to
his employer's business and acquired therein.... He is not, however, entitled to solicit
customers for such rival business before the end of his employment nor can he properly
do other similar acts in direct competition with the employer's business." Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 393, comment e (cited in note 131). This provision tracks the conclu-
sion of the LanghoffI court. See text accompanying note 18.
' See, for example, Vowell, 679 S2d at 639 (finding breach of fiduciary duty to profes-
sional corporation where departing attorney-shareholder, while still an officer, director,
and shareholder of the corporation, contacted and agreed to represent clients of corpora-
tion and did not disclose these contacts to other attorneys); Dowd, 672 NE2d at 862-63
(finding that cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was sufficiently stated where de-
parting members of professional law corporation allegedly failed to inform the corporation
that they were going to start their own law firm until their resignations and solicited sev-
eral corporation employees before resignations). But see Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation
of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Discipli-
nary Liability, 50 U Pitt L Rev 1, 102-06 (1988) (arguing that pre-departure negotiation
with clients regarding future representation supports client's freedom of choice).
'See, for example, Bray, 702 SW2d at 270-71 (holding that associates' preparation to
leave law firm to enter into competition is not sufficient to constitute breach of fiduciary
duty, absent evidence that they solicited business of the law firm while employed); Mee-
han, 535 NE2d at 1264 (holding that former partners' secret setting up of new firm dur-
ing tenure at old firm did not breach fiduciary duty, but unfairly acquiring consent from
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Grabbing and leaving usually results in unjust enrichment
for the breaching attorney-shareholder. Such a breach of fiduci-
ary duty should therefore be remedied by returning the parties to
the same position they were before the breach.'40 Applying a
partnership solution that forces the breaching attorney to turn
the fees received from improperly removed cases over to the firm
to be divided among his fellow partners or shareholders on a pro
rata basis accomplishes this task, because it is the result that
would have occurred had the attorney not left the firm. Recog-
nizing this fact, courts have applied this remedy to improper at-
torney withdrawals from both professional corporations' and
partnerships.
One might be concerned that judicial oversight will under-
mine the default rule's simplicity and uniformity of application
by requiring courts to examine factual circumstances to deter-
mine whether a breach of fiduciary duty occurred. The case law
demonstrates, however, that the required factfinding is ex-
tremely limited; courts need only determine whether the attor-
ney solicited firm clients or employees prior to withdrawal and
without disclosure to his fellow attorneys. The administrative
costs of such a determination should be relatively small.
In addition, courts can play an especially useful role in
regulating "grabbing and leaving" because attorneys cannot eas-
ily do so through private contract. Noncompetition clauses are
generally discouraged by rules of legal ethics.' Furthermore,
courts often strike them down as inconsistent with the public's
right to select the attorney of its choice.' Judicial involvement in
clients to remove cases from old firm at same time did).
"This remedy is the contract law remedy of restitution. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 344 (1981); Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 12.1 at 786
(West 1973).
"'See Vowell, 679 S2d at 640. The Vowell court allowed the withdrawing attorney-
shareholder a "reasonable hourly rate" for the time he spent completing the work on the
cases he took from the old firm. Id. This extension of the UPA's allowance for "reasonable
overhead expenses" is questionable, because it seems to remain neutral between a breach
and nonbreach rather than actively discouraging breaches.
'See Meehan, 535 NE2d at 1269-71.
"See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6 (ABA 1995) (providing that "[a]
lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a partnership or employment
agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the rela-
tionship..."); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-108 (ABA 1982) (same).
'See, for example, Whiteside v Griffis & Griffis, PC, 902 SW2d 739, 743-44 (Tex Ct
App 1995) (holding that provision in stock agreement that withdrawing shareholder could
not practice law or compete against the corporation within a radius of three hundred
miles for a period of five years void as against Texas Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 2-108); Judge v Bartlett, Pontiff, Stewart & Rhodes PC, 197 AD2d 148, 610 NYS2d
412, 413-14 (NY App Div 1994) (holding that termination of agreement requiring forfei-
ture of 75 percent of future benefits for competition was void as against New York Code of
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this area should therefore be welcomed by both the courts and
the parties involved.
Second, the courts can enforce an attorney's fiduciary duty to
his client. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct both provide significant
constraints on attorney mobility. On the most basic level, the at-
torney must act in the best interest of the client. 5 In addition,
disciplinary rules prevent an attorney from taking on a client's
representation when he possesses a potential conflict of inter-
est.'46 Where it would be in the best interest of the client to retain
the professional corporation's representation, the combined effect
of these rules should greatly minimize the risk of "grabbing and
leaving."
2. The problem of an attorney-shareholder owning
worthless shares after withdrawal.
If an attorney-shareholder leaves a professional corporation
and nothing in the state statutes, the articles of incorporation, or
the corporate bylaws provides for an automatic redemption of
shares, the attorney may end up holding shares that are value-
less because of the lack of a market for them. 4 The corporation
might either refuse to redeem the shares or coerce the departing
attorney-shareholder into selling the shares at a discount. Al-
though the shareholder may request that a court dissolve the
corporation, that request is unlikely to succeed because courts
may well be hesitant to dissolve a profitable corporation.'
Professional Responsibility DR 2-108); Spiegel v Thomas, Mann & Smith, PC, 811 SW2d
528, 529-31 (Ten 1991) (holding that conditioning deferred compensation on not prac-
ticing law violates Disciplinary Rule 2-108 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court).
See generally Hillman, Lawyer Mobility § 2.3.4 at 2:45-77 (cited in note 1).
"See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-1 ("The professional judgment
of a lawyer should be exercised... solely for the benefit of his client."), EC 5-2 ("A lawyer
should not accept proferred employment if his personal interests or desires will.., affect
adversely the . . . service to be rendered the prospective client."), EC 5-11 ("A lawyer
should not permit his personal interests to influence his advice relative to a suggestion by
his client that additional counsel be employed.").
"'See Model Code of Professional Conduct DR 5-101 ("[A] lawyer shall not accept em-
ployment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be ... af-
fectd... [by] his personal interests."), DR 5-105 ("A lawyer shall decline proferred em-
ployment... if it would be likely to involve him in representing different interests."), DR
5-107 ("Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept
legal compensation for his legal services from one other than his client."). See also Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 1.7(h) ("A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client or to a third party, or by the lawyer's own interests .....
" See Part II.B.2.
" See note 19.
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While the courts in Vinail and Melby have suggested that
courts should order the automatic redemption of shares upon
termination of an attorney's employment, 49 such a solution is
unmanageable and also undermines incentives for parties to set-
tle these issues in advance. Automatic redemption does solve the
equitable problem created by the illiquidity of professional corpo-
rations' shares.5 ° It also avoids the possible ethical problem of a
shareholder owning shares in multiple law corporations at the
same time.'5 ' However, many courts have adopted a better view,
rejecting this solution on the principle that courts should defer to
the business judgment of the majority shareholders and should
refrain from writing a contract for the parties. 2 Ordering an
automatic redemption would also necessarily require the courts
to calculate a fair value for the shares, a task that involves com-
plex factfinding for which they may be ill-suited. Given these
limitations, courts should not order an automatic redemption of a
departing attorney's shares. While the corporate law solution
may occasionally be inequitable in these cases, it provides incen-
tives to private parties to contract in advance in order to avoid
this inequity.'53
CONCLUSION
Courts are frequently called upon to allocate the unfinished
business of a professional corporation upon an attorney-
shareholder withdrawal. Courts currently base their decision on
whether to apply partnership law or corporate law to such a
withdrawal upon an implicit categorization of the withdrawal as
either a dissolution or non-dissolution of the professional corpo-
ration. While this categorization of withdrawals is sensible,
courts destroy hopes of a uniform application of the rule by often
resorting to factfinding in cases that present extenuating circum-
stances. In place of this ad hoc approach, courts should use a
bright line default rule under which partnership law applies to
an attorney withdrawal only where there is clear evidence of dis-
solution of the professional corporation. Corporate law should be
"Vinal, 651 P2d at 852; Melby, 286 NW2d at 375.
1 0 See Corlett, 478 S2d at 835-36 (Hubbart dissenting); Berrett, 876 P2d at 375-76
(Stewart dissenting).
"'See Berrett, 876 P2d at 375-76.
'See text accompanying notes 76-80. In contrast to the problems pertaining to
"grabbing and leaving," attorneys can easily provide for redemption in advance.
'For an economic explanation of why automatic buyout rights are undesirable, see
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 242 (cited in note
19).
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applied in all other circumstances. Corporate law under this rule
entails terminating an attorney-shareholder's fiduciary duties to
complete firm business for the benefit of the continuing attorney-
shareholders upon his departure from the professional corpora-
tion-regardless of whether he has sold his ownership shares
back to the professional corporation.
Such an approach is more faithful to both the statutory lan-
guage and the structure of the professional corporation than the
current approach. Furthermore, its application will benefit both
the courts and the relevant parties. Courts will save valuable ju-
dicial resources in deciding these cases and the parties will bene-
fit from the notice and predictability of the rule. Given these ad-
vantages, both courts and the parties will have an incentive to
resolve any problems that might be present under the new rule.
Aggressive enforcement of the fiduciary duties of attorneys to-
ward each other and their clients should keep to a minimum the
problem of attorneys "grabbing and leaving." Likewise, attorneys
in these situations will draft share repurchase agreements in ad-
vance to avoid the inequity of an attorney owning worthless
shares upon withdrawal.
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